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I. INTRODUCTION
Residents and commercial enterprises in the United States
generate an enormous amount of solid waste. The responsibility of
managing the collection and storage of this waste has traditionally
753
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been a municipal function,1 and disposal of the waste is a dilemma
that perpetually confronts the states. 2 With the advent of stricter
federal guidelines concerning the disposal of solid waste, state and
local governments have been forced to implement creative approaches
to handle an ever-increasing supply of garbage.
3
The two predominant strategies used by local governments to
address the dilemma are import restrictions and export restrictions.
4
Import restrictions protect landfills by limiting the amount of waste
entering the jurisdiction.5 Responding to environmental concerns over
landfills, Congress recently encouraged states and municipalities to
construct more environmentally efficient facilities.6 However, these
incinerators, recycling facilities, and other waste transfer and
disposal facilities incur tremendous expenses. 7  Therefore,
municipalities have pursued a second strategy of imposing export
restrictions in order to support the facilities.8 The "flow control"
ordinance, a common example of an export restriction, regulates the
1. See generally Eric S. Petersen and David N. Abramowitz, Municipal Solid Waste Flow
Control in the Post-Carbone World, 22 Fordham Urban L. J. 361 (1995) (discussing the role of
local governments concerning waste management in light of mandates from Congress and the
Supreme Court).
2. For a discussion of the solid waste dilemma, see generally Sidney M. Wolf, The Solid
Waste Crisis: Flow Control and the Commerce Clause, 39 S.D. L. Rev. 529 (1994) (describing the
massive amount of garbage produced by Americans and efforts to address the problem); Philip
Weinberg, Congress, the Courts, and Solid Waste Transport: Good Fences Don't Always Make
Good Neighbors, 25 Envir. L. 57 (1995) (same); Daniel M. Weisberg, Comment, Taking Out the
Trash-Where Will We Put All This Garbage?, 10 Pace Envir. L. Rev. 925 (1993) (same);
Jonathan P. Meyers, Note, Confronting the Garbage Crisis: Increased Federal Involvement as a
Means of Addressing Municipal Solid Waste Disposal, 79 Georgetown L. J. 567 (1991) (same).
3. Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), which
delegated to the states the responsibility to provide for the adequate disposal of solid waste.
Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq. (1988 ed. & Supp. V). A
primary consequence of RCRA was the gradual phasing out of open dumps and landfills. See
William L. Kovacs and Anthony A. Anderson, States as Market Participants in Solid Waste
Disposal Services-Fair Competition or the Destruction of the Private Sector?, 18 Envir. L. 779,
780-82 (1988) (discussing the impact of RCRA); Weinberg, 25 Envir. L. at 57-58 (cited in note 2)
(analyzing states' reactions to RCRA and the expanding volume of waste). See generally
Kirsten Engel, Reconsidering the National Market in Solid Waste: Trade-Offs in Equity,
Efficiency, Environmental Protection, and State Autonomy, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 1481 (1995)
(providing a perspective on the current state of municipal solid waste management).
4. Wolf, 39 S.D. L. Rev. at 531-32 (cited in note 2).
5. Weinberg, 25 Envir. L. at 58 (cited in note 2) (mentioning the strategy of import bans);
Meyers, 79 Georgetown L. J. at 575 (cited in note 2) (same).
6. See RCRA § 4003(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6943(a)(2) (requiring states that receive financial
assistance under RCRA to "prohibit the establishment of new open dumps" and to mandate that
all solid waste be either "utilized for resource recovery" or "disposed of in sanitary landfills").
See also note 3.
7. See Wolf, 39 S.D. L. Rev. at 537 (cited in note 2) (discussing the enormous costs of
waste facilities).
8. See Petersen and Abramowitz, 22 Fordham Urban L. J. at 364-65 (cited in note 1)
(discussing the enactment of export restrictions in response to congressional pressure).
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flow of garbage by dictating that waste generated within the
jurisdiction be transported to specific waste disposal or transport
facilities. 9 Export restrictions ensure that a sufficient volume of
waste is transported to facilities in which the municipality retains a
financial stake. 0
The Supreme Court, however, has struck down certain forms
of both import and export restrictions as violations of the Dormant
Commerce Clause." Historically, governmental defendants could
avoid dormant commerce clause scrutiny by claiming the market
participant exception. Under this exception, if a state acts as a
market participant rather than a market regulator, it may be immune
from dormant commerce clause scrutiny.12
9. Wolf, 39 S.D. L. Rev. at 532, 536-39 (cited in note 2); Petersen and Abramowitz, 22
Fordham Urban L. J. at 364-65 (cited in note 1).
10. Essentially, the financial arrangement between the municipalities and the disposal
facilities has been a "put-or-pay" arrangement. Wolf, 39 S.D. L. Rev. at 538 (cited in note 2). If
a municipality does not "puf' a certain amount of waste in the facility each year, it must "pay"
the difference between the amount and the contractual term. Id. See Petersen and
Abramowitz, 22 Fordham Urban L. J. at 371-73 (cited in note 1) (discussing the importance of
export restrictions as a credit risk security); Stanley Cox, Burying Misconceptions About Trash
and Commerce: Why it is Time to Dump Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 20 Capital U. L. Rev. 813,
840 (1991) (discussing the financial rationale for flow control).
11. See, for example, City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (invalidating
an import ban scheme); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 114 S. Ct. 1677,
128 L. Ed. 2d 399 (1994) (invalidating a flow control ordinance). Dormant commerce clause
analysis is rooted in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution: "Congress shall have Power ...
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states." U.S. Const., Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court has interpreted the clause to limit the authority of states to enact
regulations that discriminate against interstate commerce. See, for example, South Carolina
State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190 (1938) (requiring state regulation of
trucks to further a legitimate interest and have a reasonable relationship to that interest);
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945) (creating a balancing standard be-
tween the interest of national uniformity and the interest of a state involving a statute regulat-
ing the number of train cars). Eventually in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142
(1970), the Court developed the modern formula, holding that "[w]here the statute regulates
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate com-
merce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
State statutes that are facially discriminatory are virtually per se invalid. See, for example,
City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 (striking down a state statute that prohibited out-of-state
waste from being transported in-state). Furthermore, statutes that have discriminatory effects
on interstate commerce are unconstitutional unless the state can show that it is advancing a
legitimate interest and that the method employed is the least burdensome alternative. See, for
example, Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951) (striking down a municipal
statute requiring milk to be pasteurized within a five-mile radius of the city because it dispro-
portionately disadvantaged out-of-state dairy producers); Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising
Commn, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) (striking down a North Carolina statute requiring all apples
sold in the state to display a federal classification or none at all because it disadvantaged certain
out-of-state producers).
12. See, for example, Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976)
(upholding a Maryland subsidy program).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:753
The essence of the market participant doctrine stems from
three classic cases. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,13 the
Supreme Court upheld a Maryland subsidy program for processing
junk automobiles formerly titled in Maryland. 14 The statute forced
out-of-state junk processors to adhere to stricter procedural guidelines
than in-state processors. 15 The Alexandria Scrap Court held that
since Maryland was acting as a "purchaser" by offering bounties for
the automobiles, the Commerce Clause did not preclude it from
"participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own
citizens over others."16 A divided Court in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake17 ex-
tended the market participant exception to instances where a state
acts as a seller.18 Central to the majority's reasoning in Reeves was
the belief that states should enjoy the same amenities as private
businesses when functioning as market participants. 9 The Court
next addressed the issue in White v. Massachusetts Council of
Construction Employees, Inc.,20 where it upheld a Boston law
requiring all construction projects funded by the city to employ city
residents as at least half of their work force.21 The White Court held
that because Boston acted as a buyer by funding the projects, it
served as a market participant and could grant preferences to its own
citizens.22
13. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
14. Id. at 796-801. The intent of the statute was to alleviate the problem of abandoned
vehicles. Id. at 796.
15. Id. at 800-01.
16. Id. at 810.
17. 447 U.S. 429 (1980). Reeves involved a state-owned South Dakota cement plant that
limited its sales to state residents. Id. at 432.
18. Id. at 436-37. According to the Court,
[t]he basic distinction drawn in Alexandria Scrap between States as market participants
and States as market regulators makes good sense and sound law. As that case ex-
plains, the Commerce Clause responds principally to state taxes and regulatory meas-
ures impeding free private trade in the national marketplace. There is no indication of a
constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to operate freely in the
free market.
Id. (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 439. Noting the "similarities [between] private businesses and public entities
when they function in the marketplace," as well as "'the long recognized right of trader or
manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal,'" the Court concluded that "[e]venhandedness
suggests that, when acting as proprietors, States should similarly share existing freedoms from
federal constraints." Id. at 438-39, 439 n.12 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S.
300, 307 (1919)).
20. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
21. Id. at 205-06.
22. Id. at 207. A puzzling aspect of the decision, however, was the Court's struggle to de-
fine limits for the exception. On one hand, White was consistent with Alexandria Scrap and
Reeves as it maintained that the effects of Boston's activity on the labor market (of which it was
756
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These three cases indicated that analysis should focus simply
on whether the new governmental entity acted as a regulator or as a
participant. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,23
however, suggested additional requirements for the scope of the
market participant exception. In South-Central Timber, a plurality of
the Court struck down an Alaska statute mandating that all state-
owned timber be processed in Alaska 4 and refused to recognize the
market participant exception when a state "impose[d] conditions
downstream."25 A critical factor for the Court in distinguishing South-
Central Timber from Alexandria Scrap, Reeves, and White was the
fact that unlike the governmental actors in those cases, Alaska was
not a participant in the downstream market being impacted.26
However, the Court struggled to distinguish the impact on the
not a participant) were "not relevant to the inquiry" of whether Boston was a market partici-
pant. Id. at 209-10. On the other hand, the Court did acknowledge that the scope of the excep-
tion does have limitations. Id. at 211 n.7. Yet the Court maintained that it was "unnecessary in
this case to define those limits with precision, except to say that we think the Commerce Clause
does not require the city to stop at the boundary of formal privity of contract." Id. An important
factor for the majority's reasoning was that because the city was expending its own funds,
"fe]veryone affected by the order [was], in a substantial if informal sense, 'working for the city.'"
Id. It could be argued that the Court insinuated that the downstream labor market really was
not affected since the workers were essentially agents of the city. See Dan T. Coenen,
Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 Mich. L.
Rev. 395, 467 (1989) (maintaining that this analysis is "puzzling" and "blink[s] at reality").
Nevertheless, the classic market participant analysis would ignore the economic effect on other
downstream markets and merely focus on whether the government was acting as a proprietor or
a regulator with respect to the market at issue. See Richard H. Seamon, Note, The Market
Participant Test in Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis-Protecting Protectionism?, 1985 Duke
L. J. 697, 720-21 (stating that the classic market participant analysis does not focus on down-
stream markets).
23. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
24. Id. at 84.
25. Id. at 95. The downstream market in this instance was the timber processing market.
Id.
26. Id. at 98. The plurality opinion stressed that the market participant exception "is not
carte blanche to impose any conditions that the State has the economic power to dictate." Id. at
97. The opinion explains:
Alaska contends that it is participating in the processed timber market, although it ac-
knowledges that it participates in no way in the actual processing. South-Central ar-
gues, on the other hand, that although the State may be a participant in the timber
market, it is using its leverage in that market to exert a regulatory effect in the process-
ing market, in which it is not a participant. We agree with the latter position.
Id. (citations omitted). The Court later indicated that Alaska could have permissibly achieved
its goal by means of "vertical integration." Id. at 99. Thus, it appears that the Court would
likely have exculpated Alaska's activity if it had participated in both markets. See Bruce B.
Weyhrauch, Note, South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke: The Commerce
Clause and the Market Participant Doctrine, 15 Envir. L. 593, 613 (1995) (contending that
Alaska "might have prevailed" had it participated in the processing market, but noting the
negative consequences of this loophole). This notion appears to have bearing on the Second
Circuits analysis in SSC Corp. See 66 F.3d 502, 515 (2d Cir. 1995). See also Parts III.A.2 and
IV.
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upstream labor market in White.27 The South-Central Timber Court
further emphasized three factors that were not present in Reeves:
"foreign commerce, a natural resource, and restrictions on resale. ''28
South-Central Timber presents considerable confusion concern-
ing the parameters of the market participant exception. In particular,
the Court's troubling distinction between the fact pattern in White
and that in South-Central Timber has provided unclear precedent for
state and local actors seeking guidelines concerning what constitutes
impermissible meddling with downstream markets. Because the
Supreme Court has avoided explicitly addressing the market partici-
pant exception since South-Central Timber, this uncertainty lingers.
Given the primary role of municipalities in the business of
solid waste disposal, the market participant exception strongly influ-
ences municipal solid waste management. Several lower courts have
considered whether municipalities may take advantage of the excep-
tion as it relates to waste management.29 This Recent Development
examines the market participation exception for municipalities, with
a particular focus on its relation to export restrictions on solid waste.
The most notable decisions concerning the market participant
exception as applied to export restrictions are the Second Circuit's
recent holdings in SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown3 and USA
Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon.3' These two cases will likely en-
sure the viability of the market participant exception as a legitimate
mechanism by which municipalities may address the problem of solid
waste management. Prior to these two cases, the Third Circuit had
recognized the market participant exception in the context of import
restrictions; 2 SSC Corp. and USA Recycling authorize the exception
for export restrictions as well. The holdings also limit the Supreme
Court's decision in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New
27. The Court maintained that in comparison to Boston's activity, Alaska's practice
restricts the post-purchase activity of the purchaser, rather than merely the purchasing activity.
In contrast to the situation in White, this restriction on private economic activity takes place
after the completion of the parties' direct commercial obligations, rather than during the course
of an ongoing commercial relationship in which the city retained a continuing proprietary inter-
est in the subject of the contract. South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 99.
28. Id. at 96.
29. See Part II.
30. 66 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1995).
31. 66 F.3d 1272 (2d Cir. 1995). See Part III. The opinions in SSC Corp. and USA
Recycling were issued on the same day.
32. See Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, Pa. Through Lycoming County
Solid Waste Dept., 883 F.2d 245 (3rd Cir. 1989). See also notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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York, 33 in which the Court struck down an export restriction ordi-
nance because the town did not act as a market participant.34
The validity of SSC Corp. and USA Recycling depends upon
the method of market participant analysis employed. Using the clas-
sic mode of market participant analysis set forth in Alexandria Scrap,
Reeves, and White, the holdings seem correct. Yet, if an analysis akin
to that in South-Central Timber were adopted, the decisions become
difficult to justify. Thus, the Second Circuit's attempt to reconcile the
decisions with both the classic market participant exception cases and
South-Central Timber is inherently flawed. SSC Corp. and USA
Recycling illustrate the conundrum confronting lower courts as a re-
sult of the Supreme Court's failure to articulate coherently the mar-
ket participant doctrine.
SSC Corp. and USA Recycling also examine the possible nega-
tive effects of granting governments too much power under the mar-
ket participant exception. An inevitable tension exists between a gov-
ernment's right to engage in the market as a participant and the tra-
ditional enjoyment by state and local governments of antitrust immu-
nity. A plausible remedy for this problem is the proposal that as the
market participant doctrine expands, antitrust immunity should di-
minish. Such an approach would help curb the abuse of power that
potentially accompanies a market participant if it is not required to
adhere to the same standards as private actors.
Part II of this Recent Development explores the use of the
market participant exception in response to dormant commerce clause
challenges to solid waste management ordinances. Part III discusses
the facts of SSC Corp. and USA Recycling and summarizes the
Second Circuit's decisions. Part IV analyzes the opinions in their his-
torical context and suggests a coherent framework for the market par-
ticipant doctrine which reconciles the tension between the rights of
states to act as market participants and the rights of private entities
to compete on a level playing field.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
States and municipalities have utilized both import restric-
tions and export restrictions to confront the solid waste crisis.35 Both
of these schemes produced the abundance of litigation that provides
33. 114 S. Ct. 1677, 128 L. Ed. 2d 399 (1994).
34. See notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
35. See notes 4-10 and accompanying text.
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the context for SSC Corp. and USA Recycling. The courts have con-
sistently struck down attempts to act as a market regulator in these
instances under the Dormant Commerce Clause. In response, state
and local governments have attempted to re-structure their strategies
in order to utilize the market participant exception.
A. Import Restrictions
The Supreme Court has consistently limited the power of a
municipality to impose restrictions on waste entering its territory. In
the seminal case of City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,36 the Court
struck down a state statute that prohibited the importation of waste
generated out-of-state.3 7 Stressing the "evil of protectionism," the City
of Philadelphia Court maintained that the state's regulation uncon-
stitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce. 38
Nevertheless, the Court suggested it might have ruled differently if
the state had owned the landfills protected by the restriction.39 The
Court invalidated similar restrictions in three other cases. In Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dept. of Nat. Resources,4° the
Court relied on City of Philadelphia to strike down a Michigan statute
requiring private landfill owners to obtain county approval before
accepting waste generated out-of-county.41 In Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v. Hunt,42 the Court invalidated an Alabama
statute that imposed a higher disposal tax on imported hazardous
waste.43 Finally, in Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of
36. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
37. Id. at 618.
38. Id. at 626. The Court held that "[t]he New Jersey law blocks the importation of waste
in an obvious effort to saddle those outside the State with the entire burden of slowing the flow
of refuse into New Jersey's remaining landfill sites. That legislative effort is clearly impermis-
sible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution." Id. at 629.
39. Id. at 627 n.6. Specifically, the Court asserted that it would "express no opinion about
New Jersey's power, consistent with the Commerce Clause, to restrict to state residents access
to state-owned resources." Id.
40. 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
41. Id. at 355-57, 359-60. The Court noted that the effect of the statute was to grant local
waste generators "complete protection from competition from out-of-state waste producers." Id.
at 361. See generally Shaun Anderson, Comment, Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan
Dept. of Natural Resources: Solid Waste Management and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 28
New. Eng. L. Rev. 745 (1994) (observing the Coures emphasis on principles espoused in City of
Philadelphia).
42. 504 U.S. 334 (1992). The opinions of Chemical Waste and Fort Gratiot were issued on
the same day.
43. Id. at 336-37, 343. Applying strict scrutiny, the Court maintained that the statute's
"additional fee facially discriminates against hazardous waste generated in States other than
Alabama" Id. at 342. In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that if the dis-
posal facility were owned by the state, the market participant doctrine would preclude judicial
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Environmental Quality of the State of Oregon," the Court invalidated
an Oregon statute imposing a greater surcharge on out-of-state
waste. 45
A few lower courts have addressed the City of Philadelphia
Court's implication that the market participant exception should im-
munize import restrictions from scrutiny if the state owns the land-
fills in question." In Swin Resources, Inc. v. Lycoming County, Pa.
Through Lycoming County Solid Waste Dept.,47 the Third Circuit
considered a municipal regulation protecting a landfill operated by
the county.48 The landfill charged a higher disposal or "tipping" fee
for waste generated outside the surrounding six counties. 49 Citing the
supreme court market participant cases, the Third Circuit upheld the
county's practice. 50 Other lower courts have issued similar holdings.51
review. Id. at 351 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). According to Rehnquist, "Alabama may, under
the market participant doctrine, open its own facility catering only to Alabama customers." Id.
(citations omitted).
44. 114 S. Ct. 1345, 128 L. Ed. 2d 13 (1994).
45. 114 S. Ct. at 1355. The Court rejected the state's assertion that the system was fair,
noting that in-state haulers were already paying general taxes such as an income tax. Id. at
1353 (citing Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 546 n.11 (1983)). For a discussion of in-
trastate bans on waste imports imposed by local communities, see Weisberg, 10 Pace Envir. L.
Rev. at 937-40 (cited in note 2).
46. See note 39 and accompanying text.
47. 883 F.2d 245 (3rd Cir. 1989).
48. Id. at 247.
49. Id. at 248. A tipping fee is a surcharge (usually per ton) placed on waste that is dis-
posed at a given facility. Engel, 73 N.C. L. Rev. at 1491 n.40 (cited in note 3).
50. Swin, 883 F.2d at 248-51. According to the court:
In setting these prices and volume conditions, Lycoming has not crossed the line that
Alaska crossed when that state attempted to regulate the timber-processing market by
conditioning its timber sales on guarantees that the purchasers would act in a certain
way in a downstream market. The price and volume conditions to which Swin objects do
not pertain to the operation of private landfills and do not apply beyond the immediate
market in which Lycoming transacts business.
If Maryland may decree that only those with Maryland auto hulks will receive
state bounties, it would seem that Lycoming can similarly decree that only local trash
will be disposed of in its landfill on favorable terms. If South Dakota may give prefer-
ence to local concrete buyers when a severe shortage makes that resource scarce, it
would seem that Lycoming may similarly give preference to local garbage (and hence lo-
cal garbage-producing residents) when a shortage of disposal sites makes landfills
scarce. And if Boston may limit jobs to local residents, we see no reason why Lycoming
may not limit preferential use of its landfill to local garbage (and hence local garbage-
producing residents).
Id. at 250. The court avoided addressing the application of the exception to situations involving
natural resources. Id. at 251-54. Citing Reeves, the court maintained a narrow interpretation of
"natural resources," and refused to include land available for landfills as part of the definition.
Id. at 254. A bitter dissent written by Chief Judge Gibbons characterized Lycoming's practice as
"a peculiar eruption of Dixieism." Id. at 257 (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting).
A potential problem with the majority's reasoning is that the property for the landfill was
leased by the federal government and that Lycoming obtained a substantial amount of federal
grant money from the Appalachian Regional Commission in order to build the landfill. Id. at
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Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit rejected the ownership approach in
Washington State Bldg. and Const. Trades Council, AFL-CIO v.
Spellman.52 This case can be reconciled with Swin, however, because
it struck down a state statute that prohibited imported waste from
being transported not only to the state-owned disposal site but also to
anywhere else within the state borders.53
B. Export Restrictions
The Court recently limited the use of export restrictions as
well. In the 1980s and early 1990s, several lower courts struggled
with the constitutionality of flow control ordinances. 54 These restric-
247. In White, the Supreme Court acknowledged the significance but avoided directly address-
ing the issue of whether the market participant exception applied in projects partly financed
with state funds. 460 U.S. at 212-15. The Third Circuit, however, maintained that the issue
was "irrelevant" without providing sufficient elaboration. Swin, 883 F.3d at 250. See Paul S.
Kline, Publicly-Owned Landfills and Local Preferences: A Study of the Market Participant
Doctrine, 96 Dickinson L. Rev. 331, 391-94 (1992) (criticizing Swin and suggesting that the
market participant doctrine does not apply when federal subsidization is involved).
51. See, for example, Lefrancois v. State of Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1212 (D.R.I.
1987) (upholding a Rhode Island statute prohibiting the transportation of out-of-state waste to a
state-owned landfill based on the market participant exception); Evergreen Waste Systems, Inc.
v. Metropolitan Service Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127, 131 (D. Or. 1986) (upholding a Portland mu-
nicipal ordinance prohibiting the disposal of out-of-district waste at the city-owned landfill);
Shayne Bros., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128, 1134 (D.D.C. 1984) (utilizing the
market participant doctrine to uphold a District of Columbia statute banning the disposal of im-
ported waste at District-owned facilities without prior permission); County Commrs of Charles
County v. Stevens, 299 Md. 203, 473 A.2d 12, 19 (1984) (upholding a county ordinance prohibit-
ing disposal of out-of-county waste at a county-owned facility). These cases also rejected the
notion that landfill sites should be identified as natural resources. See Coenen, 88 Mich. L. Rev.
at 460-62 (cited in note 22) (commending the above cited courts' interpretation of the natural
resource exception with regard to solid waste); Kovacs and Anderson, 18 Envir. L. at 796-800,
810-13 (cited in note 3) (criticizing the above cited courts for not considering landfills to be a
natural resource). For further discussion of the natural resource exception to the market par-
ticipant doctrine with regard to solid waste, see Paul S. Weiland and Daniel Imber, Congress,
the Courts and the Interstate Transport of Solid Waste, 4 Dickinson J. Envir. L. & Policy 79, 84-
85 (1994) (discussing the problem of classifying landfills as natural resources); Meyers, 79
Georgetown L. J. at 578-79 (cited in note 2) (same); Michael J. Polelle, A Critique of the Market
Participant Exception, 15 Whittier L. Rev. 647, 672-74 (1994) (same); Kline, 96 Dickinson L.
Rev. at 404-413 (cited in note 50) (same); Bradford C. Mank, Out-of-State Trash: Solid Waste
and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 38 Wash. U. J. Urban & Contemp. L. 25, 43-51 (1990)
(arguing that landfills are a "mixture" of natural resources and services); David Pomper,
Comment, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce Clause,
Postindustrial "Natural" Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1309, 1323,
1331-33 (1989) (same).
52. 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982).
53. Id. at 631. This convinced the Ninth Circuit that the state of Washington was acting
with regulatory interests as opposed to economic interests. Id. The court also noted that the
state's imposition of criminal penalties was an act "which only a state and not a mere proprietor
can enforce." Id.
54. See, for example, J. Filiberto Sanitation, Inc. v. New Jersey Dept. of Envir. Protection,
557 F.2d 913, 921-22 (3rd Cir. 1988) (emphasizing evenhandedness while upholding a county
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tions remained the center of much constitutional debate until the
Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Carbone, where the Court
established that a government acting in its regulatory mode cannot
impose export restrictions on solid waste.55 In Carbone, the Court
invalidated a Clarkstown, New York, flow control ordinance that
required all waste within town limits to be transported to a transfer
station designated by the town. 56 The transfer station charged a
tipping fee and segregated recyclable items from nonrecyclable waste
before transporting them to appropriate facilities. 57
The Court found that the ordinance discriminated against in-
terstate commerce for two reasons.58  First, it increased the cost for
out-of-state waste generators, since they incurred an additional ex-
pense for disposing nonrecyclables at the transfer station.5 9 Second,
the preference for the local transfer station prevented out-of-state
companies from competing with the local stations 0 Since the ordi-
ordinance requiring that all county garbage be transported to a county-owned transfer station
from which the county facilitated the disposal), overruled in part by Atlantic Coast Demolition &
Recycling v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic City, 48 F.3d 701 (3rd Cir. 1995); Hybud
Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, Ohio, 654 F.2d 1187, 1194-95 (6th Cir. 1981) (upholding a city
flow control ordinance because it "f[e]ll hardest" on the city's residents, who retained a voice in
the political process), vacated 455 U.S. 93 (1982); Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. Delaware Solid
Waste Authority, 600 F. Supp. 1369, 1380 (D. Del. 1985) (upholding an evenhanded state flow
control statute with only an incidental effect on interstate commerce). But see Stephen D.
DeVito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v. Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775,
783 (D.R.I. 1991) (enjoining a state flow control ordinance which the court found did not apply
evenhandedly because it established an absolute ban on exporting solid waste, conferring a
direct economic advantage to the state-owned solid waste facility to the detriment of the out-of-
state competitor); Waste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin, Minn., 985 F.2d 1381, 1388 (8th
Cir. 1993) (striking down a Minnesota county flow control ordinance as a protectionist measure
which discriminated against interstate commerce). See also Martin E. Gold, Solid Waste
Management and the Constitution's Commerce Clause, 25 Urban Law. 21, 47 (1993)
(characterizing DeVito and Waste Systems as "particularly worrisome because the market
participation exception for publicly owned facilities could have been, but was not, applied in
those two exportation cases").
55. 114 S. Ct. at 1683-84.
56. Id. at 1684. The ordinance applied to waste generated within the town as well as
waste generated outside the town but brought into the town. Violators of the ordinance faced a
fine and incarceration. The town arranged for a private company to build the transfer station
and operate it for five years. Id. at 1680.
57. Id. The tipping fee was set at $81 per ton, which exceeded the private market price.
Id. The plaintiff, C & A Carbone, operated a recycling facility in Clarkstown, where it also sepa-
rated recyclables from nonrecyclables. The ordinance prevented Carbone from hauling nonre-
cyclables itself and mandated that Carbone "pay a tipping fee on trash that Carbone ha[d] al-
ready sorted." Id. at 1681.
58. Id. at 1681-83. The Court recognized that the processing and disposal services consti-
tuted the articles of commerce rather than the waste itself. Id. at 1682.
59. Id. at 1681.
60. Id. 'The ordinance thus deprives out-of-state businesses of access to a local market."
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nance was facially discriminatory, the Court applied strict scrutiny,6'
striking it down because less burdensome alternatives were available
to support the transfer station, including the subsidization of the fa-
cility by means of bonds or "general taxes."6 2
Before Carbone, only one case of note existed in which a gov-
ernment asserted the market participant exception as a defense to its
export restriction practice. In Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Southeast
Alabama Solid Waste Disposal Authority,63 an Alabama district court
invalidated an export restriction scheme devised by three cities.6 4
These cities, along with other local governments in the region, had
formed an "authority" to provide for the efficient disposal of solid
waste.65 The authority planned to construct a waste disposal facility
and three transfer stations.66 Contracts between the authority and
the cities required each city to adopt a flow control ordinance mandat-
ing that all waste generated within its borders be delivered to the
authority.6 7 The contracts further required that the cities prohibit the
construction of other disposal facilities.68 One of the cities, Geneva,
passed an ordinance maintaining that the city possessed ownership
rights in all garbage generated within its borders. 69 It also prohibited
private haulers from contracting with its residents unless the haulers
had a contract with the city.70
61. Id. at 1682-83.
62. Id. at 1684. This option was also mentioned by Justice O'Connor in her concurring
opinion. Id. at 1690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor maintained that the transfer
station could have been financed permissibly by lowering its tipping fee "to a level competitive
with other waste processing facilities." Id. Justice O'Connor did not join the majority because
she felt that the ordinance did not discriminate against interstate commerce. Id. at 1687-89.
Instead, she thought the ordinance had a burdensome impact on interstate commerce and, thus,
applied the Pike formula. Id. at 1687, 1689-91. See note 11 (describing the Pike standard).
63. 814 F. Supp. 1566 (M.D. Ala. 1993), affirmed without opinion 29 F.3d 641 (11th Cir.
1994).
64. Id. The three cities, Headland, Geneva, and Ozark, were the named representatives of
thirty-six local governments that intended to adopt laws regulating the disposal of solid waste
generated and collected within their borders. Id. at 1569.
65. Id. The authority was a public non-profit organization.
66. Id. at 1569-70. The authority expected to finance the project through revenue bonds
secured by the promise of its tipping fee revenue. Id. at 1570 & n.5.
67. Id. at 1570.
68. Id. This import restriction was similar to the one struck down in Spellman. See notes
52-53 and accompanying text.
69. Waste Recycling, 814 F. Supp. at 1570. The intent of the city was to establish that it
had a "proprietary interest in all waste within its borders and that, as a result, it [could] require
private haulers to contract directly with the city to collect all commercial waste and direct all
transactions involving this waste without regard to commerce clause restrictions." Id. at 1575.
70. Id. at 1570. The Headland flow control ordinance granted the city the option of collect-
ing waste or allowing private haulers to contract directly with waste producers. Id. But under
either option, the waste had to be disposed of at the Authority's facility. The Ozark ordinance
764
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The Waste Recycling court refused to credit a market partici-
pant exception argument and struck down the scheme. 71 The "critical
question" for the court was whether the government acted as a pro-
prietor or a regulator.72 Contrasting the city ordinances from the
statutes in Alexandria Scrap, Reeves, and White, the court found that
the cities intended to ensure the financial viability of the authority
rather than to compete as private enterprises. 73 In addition, the court
held that the ordinances were similar to the unconstitutional South-
Central Timber statute because the ordinances sought to "regulate
outside the market in which the cities are actual participants."74
Central to this determination was the court's finding that the author-
ity was an entity distinct from the cities. 75 The court also noted that
the ordinances impermissibly prevented solid waste from becoming a
component of the interstate market, since they prohibited private
haulers from transporting it out-of-state.76 Furthermore, these
ordinances prevented out-of-state companies from competing in the
region.77 The court rebuked Geneva's "vesting title" provision by
characterizing it as a futile attempt to circumvent commerce clause
limitations78 Concluding that the market participant exception was
allowed haulers to transport the waste out-of-state, but they were forced to adhere to more
stringent reporting requirements. Id.
71. Id. at 1571-77.
72. Id. at 1572.
73. Id. at 1572-73. According to the court,
fiun signing the user contracts, therefore, the three cities entered the solid waste mar-
kets not to compete for their own individual profit, as would private businesses, but
rather they did so to assure the economic success of the Authority. The expressed intent
behind these contracts and the three representative ordinances based on them is not
individual market participation but broad market regulation.
Id. at 1573. The court emphasized the term "control" in the language of the "flow control" ordi-
nances and maintained that this suggested regulation rather than participation. Id. Also not-
ing other features such as imposition of penalties for violators, the court held that "[t]hese are
not the types of measures which private participants in the marketplace could implement." Id.
74. Id. at 1573.
75. Id. at 1574. Although all thirteen of the authority's board of directors were elected by
the participating municipalities, "no one local government is able to direct the actions of the
Authority. The Authority is therefore independent of the cities." Id. The court also noted that
with respect to the market for waste collection services, Ozark's ordinance impermissibly ap-
plied to private commercial waste haulers. Since Ozark was only participating in this service
market as the sole residential garbage collector, it could not extend its power as a participant in
the residential market to include the commercial market, in which it was not a participant. Id.
76. Id. at 1573. As mentioned previously, Ozark's ordinance permitted the transportation
of the waste across state borders, but with heightened reporting requirements. Id. at 1570.
77. Id. at 1574. The court cited Reeves, which applied the market participant exception,
but observed that South Dakota had not "restricted the ability of private firms or sister States to
set up plants within its borders." Id. at 1574-75 (quoting Reeves, 447 U.S. at 444).
78. Id. at 1575. The court quoted South-Central Timber, maintaining that "[i]t is the sub-
stance of the transaction, rather than the label attached to it, that governs Commerce Clause
analysis." Id. (quoting South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 99 n.11). After scrutinizing Geneva's
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:753
not applicable, the court applied dormant commerce clause scrutiny
and invalidated the authority's regulations.79
After Carbone, it was unclear whether the market participant
exception remained a valid defense to cases challenging export re-
strictions under the Commerce Clause. The only subsequent decision
to address the issue was the lower court opinion in Southcentral
Pennsylvania Waste Haulers Assn. v. Bedford-Fulton-Huntingdon
Solid Waste Authority.80 The Southcentral Pennsylvania court struck
down a flow control ordinance as facially discriminatory.81 The
plaintiffs raised a constitutional challenge to a three-county
agreement that created a solid waste management authority which
owned and operated disposal facilities.82  By contract between the
counties and the authority, all waste generated within the three
counties was transported to an authority facility which charged a tip-
ping fee for the refuse81 The counties argued that the market partici-
pant exception should apply since the disposal facilities were publicly
owned.84
The district court ruled that the market participant exception
did not apply to the authority scheme. 85 Relying on South-Central
Timber, the court adopted a narrow interpretation of "market," and
held that the counties were not participants in the waste collection
market.86 The court also cited Waste Recycling as support for its as-
ordinance and the city's prior suggestions that solid waste is "valueless material," the court
concluded that the city's provision was a "fakery and a pretext." Id. at 1575-76. The court also
determined that even if Geneva possessed title to the waste, after private haulers collected the
garbage the city would cease to own title. Id. at 1576.
79. Id. at 1577-83. The court found that the ordinances were facially discriminatory in
addition to having a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 1578-80.
80. 877 F. Supp. 935 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
81. Id. at 942.
82. Id. at 937-38.
83. Id. at 938. In all three counties, private citizens and businesses contracted with pri.
vate garbage haulers. Id. at 946. Violators of the mandate faced "substantial sanctions." Id. at
938.
84. Id. at 945. Thus the counties asserted that their participation in the waste disposal
market should enable them to impose restrictions in the hauling market. They further at-
tempted to equate county residents with the county governments in order to extend the domain
of the exception. Id. The court noted that the counties cited no case law for this proposition and
concluded that if the proposition were adopted, "it is difficult to see what a locality could not do
in the name of its citizens" Id. at 946.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 945-46. According to the court:
Specifically, the market for trash collection and hauling clearly is distinct from the
market for trash disposal. Equally clear is the fact that Defendants are not participants
in all of these markets. Defendants do not haul waste. Nor, to the extent relevant here,
do Defendants purchase waste hauling services. Rather, individual trash generators
within the Counties contract for themselves with haulers for the collection and disposal
of waste.
766
1996] SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT 767
sertion that the counties' actions resembled a government serving as
a regulator rather than a participant acting with proprietary inter-
ests. 87
III. THE INSTANT DECISIONS
The Second Circuit's decisions in SSC Corp. and USA
Recycling provide strong authority for the market participant excep-
tion in the context of export restrictions. They eliminate uncertainty
created by Carbone and provide direction for local and state govern-
ments seeking to avoid dormant commerce clause challenges.
A. SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown
1. Facts and Procedural Posture
In response to pressure by federal and state government in the
mid-1980s, 88 the town of Smithtown, New York, entered into an
agreement with the neighboring Long Island town of Huntington to
create a mutual refuse disposal service.8 9 The towns then contracted
with Ogden Martin Systems, Inc. for the towns to finance Ogden's
construction of an incinerator on Huntington land.9 0 Ogden then be-
Id. at 946.
87. Id. The court stated:
Defendants do not seek to affect the market as would any other market participant,
through the use of market power or leverage. Rather, the Counties and the Authority
were able to implement the flow control policy "only because of the regulatory powers
they possess as sovereigns ... these are not the types of measures which private partici-
pants in the marketplace could implement." Defendants have not conditioned the pur-
chase or sale of their goods but have mandated the terms and conditions under which
others (i.e. individual citizens and haulers) can contract. This is market regulation and,
as such, is subject to the strictures of the Commerce Clause.
Id. (quoting Waste Recycling, 814 F. Supp. at 1573).
88. See notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
89. SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 506. The pressure exerted by the state government is reflected
in the Long Island Landfill Law of 1983, N.Y. Envir. Conserv. Law § 27-0704 (McKinney, 1984
& Supp. 1995), which imposed deadlines on communities for closing down their contaminated
municipal dumps. The state legislature encouraged towns to replace these landfills with
incinerators or other more productive waste management facilities by authorizing the
municipalities to contract with private companies to construct and operate the facilities. Id. §
27-106; N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 120-w (McKinney, 1986 & Supp. 1994). Federal governmental
pressure existed pursuant to RCRA which imposed regulations on landfills. SSC Corp., 66 F.3d
at 506 n.7. See note 6 and accompanying text.
90. SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 507. To finance the construction of the facility, the towns used
tax-free bonds issued by the New York State Environmental Facilities Corporation, a state
authority. They loaned proceeds of the bonds to Ogden and secured the bonds by a twenty-five
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came sole owner and operator of the facility and the towns received
the exclusive right to determine what refuse would be transported to
the incinerator as well as the right to charge tipping fees.91
Smithtown financed its portion of the agreement with the tipping fees
and ad valorem property taxes.92
Smithtown utilized two strategies to facilitate a steady flow of
waste to the incinerator and thus ensure its economic viability.9 3
First, it enacted a flow control ordinance that required licensed gar-
bage haulers to transport all refuse generated in Smithtown to the
Huntington incinerator and pay a tipping fee. 94 Violators of the ordi-
nance faced a maximum fine of $5,000 and a maximum of sixty days'
imprisonment.95 Second, Smithtown divided its residential area into
ten garbage-collection districts.96 After soliciting contract bids from
private haulers for every district, the town granted the lowest bidders
in each district an exclusive right to service that respective district. 97
The contract required the haulers, however, to transport all
residential waste to the incinerator and pay the tipping fee. 98 Seven
of these contracts were awarded to SSC Corporation, which began
servicing the districts in 1992. 99 Two years later, Smithtown withheld
payments to SSC after it learned that the hauler breached its contract
by transporting the garbage to unauthorized incinerators. 100
SSC sought injunctive relief from the District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, claiming that the contract and the flow
control ordinance violated the Commerce Clause.101 Smithtown filed a
year commitment to compensate Ogden for its costs related to the incinerator. The towns were
obligated to reimburse Ogden regardless of the amount of waste received by the incinerator.
Ultimately, Ogden, a private New Jersey corporation, was responsible for repaying the public
bonding authority. Id.
91. Id. at 506-07.
92. Id. at 507.
93. Id.
94. Id. The ordinance applied to residential as well as commercial waste. The tipping fee
was set at $65 per ton, but haulers were not charged for recyclables, which had to be trans.
ported to a nearby recycling facility. The town maintained that the purpose of the tipping fee
was to encourage recycling. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. It was expected that the bid proposal would reflect the $65 tipping fee. Id. at 507
n.14.
99. Id. at 507. SSO's bid of $218 per year per household took into account the cost of col-
lection as well as disposal. Smithtown assessed this figure on homeowners' property tax bills,
and it used the revenue to reimburse SSC under the contract. Id. at 508.
100. Id. In April, 1994, Smithtown alleged that SSC was wrongfully profiting by disposing
the waste at incinerators with less expensive tipping fees. Therefore, the town board voted to
withhold over $750,000 in payments owed to SSC. Id.
101. Id. The action was brought pursuant to Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988 ed.).
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counterclaim alleging breach of contract. 1 2 The district court ruled in
favor of SSC and invalidated Smithtown's flow control ordinance and
the contract as unconstitutional restraints on interstate commerce.
Claiming a market participant exception under the Dormant
Commerce Clause, Smithtown appealed the case to the Second
Circuit.0
3
2. The Decision
A unanimous three-judge panel affirmed the portion of the dis-
trict court's opinion holding that Smithtown's flow control ordinance
violated the Commerce Clause.114 The panel reversed the district
court with regard to the SSC agreements, determining that the exclu-
sive contracts satisfied constitutional scrutiny.10 5
Addressing the flow control ordinance, the Second Circuit first
discounted Smithtown's argument that it acted as a market partici-
pant. °6 According to the court, the market participant exception only
applies if the defendant's actions could have been undertaken by a
private entity.O7 Because Smithtown imposed criminal penalties on
violators, it functioned as a regulator as opposed to a participant.1o8
The court then applied dormant commerce clause analysis. 0 9 Citing
Carbone, the court found that Smithtown's flow control ordinance
102. SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 508.
103. Id. at 506.
104. Id. The opinion was written by Judge Cabranes and joined by Chief Judge Newman
and Judge Van Graafeiland.
105. Id. at 506.
106. Id. at 512-13. Smithtown argued that it was acting as a participant because of its
significant financial investment in the incinerator. Thus, it enacted the ordinance to protect the
public stake. Id. at 512.
107. Id. at 512 (citing Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454-58 (1992) (invalidating an
Oklahoma statute mandating that in-state electrical utilities use a minimum amount of coal
mined in Oklahoma on grounds that while the state could act through a public utility as a mar-
ket participant and set limits of purchased coal, it could not extend its control beyond this)). See
id. at 455-58 (stating that "[w]hen a public entity participates in a market, it may sell and buy
what it chooses, to or from whom it chooses, on terms of its choice; its market participation does
not, however, confer upon it the right to use its regulatory power to control the actions of others
in that market' (quoting Atlantic Coast Demolition, 48 F.3d at 717 (refusing to grant a market
participant exception since the government's flow control ordinance applied to both publicly as
well as privately owned disposal facilities)).
108. SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 512. The court cited Spellman, 684 F.2d at 631, in which the
Ninth Circuit rejected the market participation classification in a situation involving "'civil and
criminal penalties which only a state and not a mere proprietor can enforce."' SSC Corp., 66
F.3d at 512. See note 52 and accompanying text. The court also noted Smithtown's threat of
criminal penalties to refute the town's claim that the ordinance was identical to that in Swin.
SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 513.
109. SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 513.
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constituted facial discrimination against interstate commerce. 110
Because less burdensome alternatives were available to the town, the
ordinance failed the "rigorous scrutiny" standard.1 '
Next, the court addressed Smithtown's exclusive contracts.112
It concluded that Smithtown acted as a market participant when it
entered into contractual relationships with garbage haulers."3
Comparing the town's scheme to that of Boston in White, the court
found that Smithtown was a "buyer" of garbage collection and
disposal services.114 Therefore, the town retained the power to
mandate where its contractual haulers disposed of its waste.15 The
court, however, made a painstaking attempt to distinguish
Smithtown's actions from the scenario in South-Central Timber.16
The court essentially implied that it was necessary for Smithtown to
110. Id. at 514. The court based this conclusion on the fact that the ordinance "direct[ed]
all town waste to a single local disposal facility, to the exclusion of both in-state and out-of-state
competitors." Id. For a discussion of Carbone, see notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
111. SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 514. After the court determined that the ordinance was facially
discriminatory, the ordinance faced virtual per se invalidity. Id. This stringent standard
requires that the ordinance be narrowly tailored in order to provide for the least burdensome
alternative. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624. In the instant case, the court referred to
Carbone in holding that less burdensome options to secure the financial viability of the
incinerator included a general tax and an enactment of uniform regulations. SSC Corp., 66
F.3d at 514.
112. Id. at 514-16.
113. See notes 20-22.
114. SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 515-17. The court found that Smithtown was "substantial[ly] if
informal[ly]" receiving services from the contractors. Id. at 515 (citing White, 460 U.S. at 211
n.7). The town's stake was reinforced by its potential liability under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988
ed. & Supp. V). SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 516. The court also addressed Smithtown's reasons for
charging a tipping fee for use of the incinerator and then reimbursing the contractors, instead of
charging no tipping fee and making no reimbursements. Id. at 515. According to the court, the
tipping fees served four primary objectives: (1) they avoided the "free-rider" problem of
contracting haulers dumping out-of-town waste into the town incinerator free of charge, (2) they
encouraged haulers to separate recyclables because of the free disposal charge at the recycling
facility, (3) they discouraged bidding contractors from "low-balling" their bids, because if a
district produces more waste than expected then the haulers must pay the fees and assume the
difference, and (4) they enabled the town to fluctuate the user fees that the citizens are charged.
Id. "Thus, the principal purpose of the pass-through mechanism is to minimize the town's costs
of monitoring SSC's performance under the contract." Id.
115. Id. at 517. Referring to White, the court held:
If Boston could require contractors for city-funded projects to hire a certain percentage
of city residents, then Smithtown can require SSC to hire town residents to drive its
garbage trucks since those truck drivers would be "in a substantial if informal sense,
working for the city." And if Smithtown can require SSC to hire local truck drivers, then
it can require the hauler to use local incinerating services as well. It makes no differ-
ence in our estimation whether those services are provided by a private company like
Ogden, or by a public entity like Smithtown.
Id. at 515 (quoting White, 460 U.S. at 211 n.7).
116. Id.
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be a participant in the disposal market as well as the hauling
market. n7
The SSC Corp. court expressly rejected the Alabama district
court's analysis in Waste Recycling.1 s According to the Second
Circuit, a state activity motivated by a protectionist objective is not
inherently market regulation. 19 Furthermore, the court repudiated
the notion that a municipality must retain a proprietary interest in
the waste in order for it to impose contractual restrictions. l 0
Responding to SSC Corp.'s contention that Smithtown was
acting as a market regulator because otherwise it would be suscepti-
ble to antitrust law,121 the court first expressed doubt that market
participants are even subject to antitrust law. 122 Even so, the court
rejected SSC Corp.'s logically inverted argument on the principle that
courts should avoid construing a statute in a manner that raises a
constitutional issue.' 23
B. USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon
1. Facts and Procedural Posture
USA Recycling, decided on the same day as SSC Corp., in-
volved a similar fact pattern. Plaintiff USA Recycling, Inc., a solid
waste recycling management business, brought suit against the Town
of Babylon, New York, and Babylon Source Separation Commercial,
117. Id. For a detailed discussion of this problematic analysis undertaken by the court, see
notes 23-29.
118. SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 516. For a discussion of Waste Recycling, see notes 63-79 and
accompanying text.
119. SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 516. The court referred to the Supreme Courts market partici-
pation framework in support of the proposition that "policies, while perhaps 'protectionist in a
loose sense, reflect the essential and patently unobjectionable purpose of state government-to
serve the citizens of the State." Id. (quoting Reeves, 447 U.S. at 442).
120. Id. at 516. Citing Carbone, the court maintained that Smithtown had a valuable in-
terest in the hauling and disposal services themselves. Id.
121. Id. at 517.
122. Id. The court cited precedent indicating that since Smithtown was acting pursuant to
state policy, it should receive antitrust immunity. According to the court, "the antitrust laws do
not prohibit local government from engaging in anticompetitive conduct 'pursuant to state policy
to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service.'" Id. (quoting City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413 (1978).
123. Id. at 518. According to the court, "SSC would have us engage in a sort of reverse-
Ashwander analysis and construe Smithtown's activity as violating the Commerce Clause rather
than the antitrust laws." Id. (citing Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288,
346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating that "even if a serious doubt of constitutionality
is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of
the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided")).
1996]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Inc. (BSSCI), a private waste hauler.124 USA Recycling alleged that
the town's creation of a commercial garbage district discriminated
against interstate commerce and, therefore, violated the Commerce
Clause.125 The allegations centered around an arrangement made be-
tween Babylon, another Ogden incinerator, and BSSCI.
Pursuant to a mandate issued by the New York legislature,
Babylon entered into a contract with Ogden to establish a waste in-
cinerator. Babylon financed the construction of the incinerator, which
was owned by the town but built and operated by Ogden.1 6 Babylon
was required to pay Ogden a service fee for operating the incinerator,
regardless of the amount of waste disposed there.127 Furthermore,
Babylon had to haul a minimum amount of 225,000 tons of garbage to
the incinerator per year. 28
Confronted with the problem of protecting the financial viabil-
ity of the incinerator while adhering to constitutional guidelines,
Babylon created a commercial waste district.29 This district was to be
exclusively serviced by a single waste hauler, BSSCI."'0 A five-year
service agreement between Babylon and BSSCI permitted BSSCI to
dispose a maximum of 96,000 tons of waste at the incinerator at no
charge.31 If BSSCI needed to dispose of waste in excess of this
amount, it had the option of either delivering it to Babylon's incinera-
tor and paying a tipping fee, or delivering it elsewhere and being
solely responsible for costs. 32 The town financed the arrangement by
imposing an annual assessment on commercial parcel owners in the
district. 3
124. USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1280-81.
125. Id. at 1275-76.
126. Id. at 1276-77. After soliciting offers from sixty-nine businesses in eighteen states and
Canada, Babylon received bids for the incinerator from five companies. The incinerator and
land on which it was built were owned by Babylon but leased to Ogden. Id. at 1277.
127. Id. at 1277-78.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1278. Prior to the creation of the district, Babylon utilized a flow control ordi-
nance, which required all waste generated in the town to be disposed at the incinerator.
Furthermore, Babylon charged tipping fees to all private haulers based on the amount of waste
that was delivered to the incinerator. After the Supreme Court's decision in Carbone, the city
repealed the ordinance. Id.
130. Id. at 1279. BSSCI was the successful bidder for the contract. Id.
131. Id. The service agreement obligated Babylon to pay BSSCI a base amount of $22.75
per week for each commercial parcel, plus additional fees for excessive waste. Although the
parties stipulated for a maximum limit of free disposal at the incinerator, BSSCI was permitted
to haul an unlimited amount of recyclable refuse to a municipal recycling facility. Id.
132. Id. Babylon retained the right to require BSSCI to deliver the waste to any other dis-
posal facility selected by the town. In this event, BSSCI would be reimbursed by Babylon for
tipping fees. Nevertheless, Babylon chose not to exercise this right. Id.
133. Id. Each basic parcel was obligated to pay $1500 in return for "basic service." A parcel
was responsible for additional user fees if it contained more than one business or if a company
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Several plaintiffs, including USA Recycling, 134 filed suit in the
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking a pre-
liminary injunction. 135  USA Recycling specifically alleged that
Babylon's waste management system structurally discriminated
against interstate commerce because it excluded private garbage col-
lectors from the district, permitted BSSCI to dispose of waste at the
town incinerator free of charge, and charged user fees exclusively to
commercial property owners located within the district.
36
The district court found that the agreement violated the
Commerce Clause.' 37 Relying on the Supreme Court's recent ruling in
Carbone, the court held that the city's scheme created a discrimina-
tory effect on interstate commerce.138 The defendants appealed to the
Second Circuit.139
2. The Decision
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision and
upheld the constitutionality of Babylon's scheme. 40 First, the court
addressed Babylon's relationship with the property owners and busi-
nesses located in the commercial district and found that the town did
not act as a market participant when it enacted the ordinance elimi-
nating the private market for commercial waste hauling.'4 ' Referring
or a parcel generated waste that exceeded the "basic service" amount of one cubic yard of refuse
and one half cubic yard of recyclables per week. Id. The Babylon Town Code was amended to
reflect the exclusive arrangement with BSSCI. The town also made it illegal for commercial
waste generators to dispose of refuse in a manner disassociated with BSSCI absent the granting
of a "special exemption" by the town board following the demonstration of "exceptional
circumstances." Id. at 1280.
134. Other plaintiffs included numerous garbage collection and transportation companies, a
waste disposal facility located out-of-state, and several individuals and businesses who owned
commercial property and businesses located in Babylon. Id. at 1280-81.
135. USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, No. 95-7129 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). Originally two
separate actions were brought by separate groups of plaintiffs. The second case filed in the dis-
trict court was AA. & M. Carting Services, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, No. 95 7131 (E.D.N.Y.
1995). The district court held a separate hearing on the USA Recycling plaintiffs' injunctive
motion but ultimately issued an order consolidating the cases. USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1280.
136. USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1280.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1280. The district court also issued the preliminary injunction despite its
finding that the plaintiffs would not suffer irreparable harm by the arrangement. Id. Chief
Judge Thomas C. Platt issued this injunction as well as the injunction in SSC Corp.
139. Id. at 1272.
140. Id. at 1276. The same three-judge panel that decided the SSC Corp. case unanimously
decided this case as well. See note 104. Judge Cabranes again wrote the opinion.
141. USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1282.
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to SSC Corp., the court emphasized that imposition of civil and crimi-
nal sanctions constituted market regulation.142
Since Babylon acted as a market regulator in this respect, the
court next considered whether the ordinance had a discriminatory
effect on interstate commerce. 43  A key aspect of this analysis
concerned USA Recycling's claim that Babylon's financing approach
discriminated against interstate commerce by imposing a tax only on
property in the commercial district rather than the entire town. 144
USA Recycling cited language in Carbone indicating that a town could
subsidize a disposal facility only by means of "general taxes or
municipal bonds." 45  USA Recycling argued that "general taxes"
connoted town-wide taxes as opposed to "special assessments" levied
on a particular area. 146 The court, however, interpreted "general
taxes" as nondiscriminatory levies that are uniformly applied to in-
state and out-of-state companies. 147  Therefore, the Second Circuit
determined that Babylon's scheme fell within the domain of the
142. Id. See Part IV.A. Although the court would later recognize that Babylon was acting
as a market participant when it purchased hauling services from BSSCI, it held that this did
not enable the town to regulate "carte blanche" USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1282.
143. USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1283. The court found that the ordinance did not favor in-
state garbage collectors over out-of-state collectors, and did not have the effect of aiding local
collectors to the detriment of in-state and out-of-state collectors. Id. In addition, responding to
the plaintiffs' claim that the arrangement was a "facade" for a flow control ordinance that dis-
criminated against in-state and out-of-state competitors, the court asserted that because
Babylon had eliminated the market, the town itself was no longer a seller of garbage services.
Id. Instead the town was acting as the "lone provider" and was fulfilling its governmental obli.
gation. Id. The court held that "the payment of taxes in return for municipal services is not
comparable to a forced business transaction that the ordinances in Carbone and Smithtown
required, and that rendered those ordinances discriminatory against interstate commerce. In
short, because Babylon is not selling anything, it cannot be considered to be a favored single
local proprietor as in Carbone." Id. Babylon's decision to hire a private hauler, BSSCI, had no
bearing on the issue because BSSCI was acting as an agent of the town. Id. at 1284.
144. Id. at 1285. The plaintiffs claimed that the taxes violated the Commerce Clause be-
cause they targeted potential customers of out-of-state garbage collection businesses. Id.
145. Id. (citing Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1684).
146. Id. Plaintiffs argued that Babylon had imposed a special assessment instead of a gen-
eral tax and, therefore, was not exempted by the language in Carbone. Id.
147. Id. The court focused on Carbone's citation to New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486
U.S. 269, 278 (1988), which held that "[d]irect subsidization of domestic industry does not
ordinarily run afoul of [the Commerce Clause]; discriminatory taxation of out-of-state manufac-
turers does." The court also illustrated that distinctions between general taxes and special
assessments have only been significant when applying the four-prong test to determine whether
the levies are "fairly related to services provided to the State." USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1285
n.12 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
The court further noted that accepting the plaintiffs' argument that the Commerce Clause
prohibits taxes aimed exclusively at businesses would "sweep away everything from state corpo-
rate income taxes to corporate franchise taxes." USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1286. The court also
emphasized the importance of special assignments by pointing out that New York law permits
local governments to create "improvement districts" for the purpose of providing a variety of
municipal services, which are primarily financed by means of "special assignments." Id.
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"general taxes" notion espoused in Carbone.148 Finding that Babylon's
elimination of the market for commercial garbage collection did not
have a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce, the court
concluded that local benefits outweighed any incidental effects on
commerce.
149
Addressing Babylon's arrangement with BSSCI, the court pro-
ceeded to broaden the market participation exception.150  USA
Recycling claimed that the town showed favoritism toward BSSCI
since BSSCI was the only hauler permitted to dispose of its waste at
Babylon's incinerator free of charge.151 Because Babylon owned the
incinerator, the court determined that the town acted as a market
participant. 152 Like the state of South Dakota in Reeves, the town par-
ticipated as a "seller" of rights to the incinerator and thus could bar-
gain at its discretion153 The court further concluded that even if
Babylon were acting as a regulator, its arrangement with BSSCI
would not present an undue burden on interstate commerce.154
Finally, the court further reinforced the market participant
doctrine when it addressed Babylon's relationship with Ogden, the
operator of the incinerator. 55 USA Recycling argued that Babylon's
148. USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1285.
149. Id. at 1286-88. Applying the Pike standard, see note 11, the court found no reason to
presume that hiring a single contractor would reduce the flow of interstate commerce. USA
Recycl;ng, 66 F.3d at 1287. It considered whether individual businesses were more inclined to
hire out-of-state garbage collectors than the town, acting as a single buyer, but concluded that
Babylon's open bidding procedure could actually enhance interstate commerce if an out-of-state
hauler were hired. Id. (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 (1981)
(holding that a state ban on nonrecyclable milk containers had an even-handed impact on inter-
state commerce)). The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' argument that the implementation of
benefits assessments and user fees would discourage interstate commerce. It concluded that
businesses wanting to hire a private hauler would effectively be forced to pay double for the
amount of the service. Id. at 1287. The court viewed this attack on the tax system as a mere
"reformulation of their challenge to the Town's assumption of collection duties ... (that) [w]e
have already rejected" Id.
150. Id. at 1288.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1288-89.
153. Id. at 1289. The court also utilized the market participant exception to counter the
plaintiffs' contention that the bidding process was skewed and was a mere pretext for granting a
monopoly to a local company. Id. The court considered this claim to be "irrelevant," since the
market participant doctrine grants vast discretion to the town to deal with whomever it chooses.
Id. The court maintained that "[n]othing in the Constitution precludes a local government from
hiring a local company precisely because it is local." Id. (citing Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at
810; White, 460 U.S. at 207; SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 510-11).
154. Id. at 1290. The court countered the plaintiffs' argument that BSSCI's free disposal
charge was effectively a subsidy by asserting that the bidding process reflected this arrange-
ment. Id. at 1289-90. The court likewise concluded that allegations of favoritism during the
bidding process were unsubstantiated. Not only was BSSCI the lowest bidder, but it had prior
experience serving the town. Id. at 1290.
155. Id. at 1291.
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scheme favored the local incinerator because the town basically guar-
anteed that all commercial waste would be transported there instead
of to out-of-state incinerators. 56 Again, the court determined that
since Babylon functioned as a "buyer" of services from Ogden to oper-
ate the incinerator, it fell within the market participant exception. 51
Babylon bought the incinerator services and was therefore free to re-
serve disposal rights for itself.158 As a market participant, Babylon
also retained the discretion to create economic incentives to aid local
business.159 The court noted that this system of "economic flow con-
trol" was consistent with Justice O'Connor's suggestion in Carbone
that a town could satisfy constitutional scrutiny by achieving flow
control through a method that offered economic incentives.160
USA Recycling also argued that Babylon's financing system of
benefit assessments and user fees amounted to a "tax-and-subsidy
scheme" constituting an unconstitutional market regulation.' 6' The
court conceded that the financing approach was a market regulation
but nevertheless found that Ogden and BSSCI were not subsidized
because resulting revenues were spent to purchase services for town
residents and to compensate the businesses for specific municipal
services. 62 The court concluded by indicating that a contrary ruling
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. The court emphasized that this notion is consistent with Alexandria Scrap, 426
U.S. at 810 ("Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the
absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to fa-
vor its own citizens over others"). USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1291.
160. USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1291 (citing Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1690 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring) (maintaining that Clarkstown could have escaped constitutional scrutiny by financing
its transfer station "by lowering its price for processing to a level competitive with other waste
processing facilities")). The court also cited Petersen and Abramowitz, 22 Fordham Urban L. J.
at 404 (cited in note 1) (stating that "[e]conomic flow control is achieved when haulers deliver
solid waste to a facility because the costs of disposal at the facility, including transportation
costs and tipping fees, are less than or comparable to those at alternative disposal sites"). USA
Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1291.
161. USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1291-92. The plaintiffs relied on West Lynn Creamery, Inc.
v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 129 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1994). USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1292. In West
Lynn Creamery, the Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts statute that diverted reve-
nues from a tax on all milk sold in the state to subsidize in-state dairy farmers:
[W]e cannot divorce the premium payments from the use to which the payments are put.
It is the entire program-not just the contributions to the fund or the distributions from
that fund-that simultaneously burdens interstate commerce and discriminates in favor
of local producers. The choice of constitutional means-nondiscriminatory tax and local
subsidy--cannot guarantee the constitutionality of the program as a whole.
114 S. Ct. at 2215.
162. USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1292. According to the court: "If anyone is 'subsidized' by
the user fees, it is the municipal treasury-not any private business. And that, of course, is the
point of every tax." Id. The court also concluded that Babylon's scheme was consistent with
what "the Supreme Court had in mind in Carbone." Id. In fact, the court observed that "[n]ot
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would necessarily overturn long-standing precedent in California
Reduction Company v. Sanitary Reductions Works 163 and Gardner v.
Michigan.164 Although these decisions involved fifth and fourteenth
amendment challenges, they specifically recognized the rights of
states to enter into exclusive arrangements with private businesses to
collect and dispose of municipal garbage.
165
IV. COMMENT AND ANALYSIS
The Second Circuit's holdings in SSC Corp. and USA Recycling
solidify the market participant exception as a viable defense to
constitutional challenges for municipalities seeking to create
restrictions on waste exports. Combined with the Third Circuit's
decision in Swin regarding import restrictions, 6  these cases ensure
that state and local governments will enjoy protection from dormant
commerce clause challenges when they act as participants in the solid
waste market in certain situations.
These decisions, in conjunction with other market participant
exception cases, have helped to create a framework that can serve as
a guideline for municipalities confronting several scenarios. One sce-
nario involves a municipality that owns a disposal facility but permits
private haulers to contract directly with its residents for waste collec-
tion. In this instance, the government would be permitted to impose
import restrictions on the facility's intake of waste. It can do this be-
cause it is participating as a seller of disposal services and can deal
with whomever it chooses. 67 As owner of the facility, however, it ap-
only is this tax fairer than an ad valorem tax-because it taxes businesses based on the actual
amount of municipal services they consume-but it also creates a greater incentive for busi-
nesses to reduce the amount of waste they generate" Id.
163. 199 U.S. 306 (1905).
164. 199 U.S. 325 (1905). See USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1294.
165. USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1293. According to the court: "If we were to rule in plain-
tiffs' favor, the municipal garbage systems upheld by the Court in California Reduction and
Gardner would be unconstitutional, and municipalities could no longer undertake the tradi-
tional governmental function of collecting town garbage." Id. at 1294.
166. For a discussion of Swin, see notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
167. This was the reasoning adopted in Swin, Lefrancois, Evergreen Waste, Shayne
Brothers, and Stevens and borrowed from City of Philadelphia. See notes 50-51 and accompany-
ing text. However, most jurisdictions would require that out-of-state businesses be permitted to
construct and operate a facility within the locality. Otherwise, this activity would likely be
considered a regulation. This would be consistent with the reasoning in Spellman, borrowed
from the dicta in Reeves. See notes 52-53 and accompanying text. But see Pomper, 137 U. Pa.
L. Rev. at 1338 (cited in note 51) (arguing against a" 'monopoly exception' to the market partici-
pant exception"); Mank, 38 Wash. U. J. Urban & Contemp. L. at 42-43 (cited in note 51)
(suggesting that dicta from Reeves makes it "unlikely that courts will refuse to apply the market
1996]
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pears that the government could not impose export restrictions on the
private haulers, because such restrictions would be prohibited as up-
stream regulations in a separate market in which the municipality is
not a participant.168
A second scenario involves a municipality's participating in the
disposal market by collecting the waste generated within its bor-
ders.169 As in the first scenario, the municipality would be permitted
to implement import restrictions by virtue of its status in the disposal
market. Furthermore, courts following the Second Circuit's reasoning
in SSC Corp. and USA Recycling would allow the government to im-
pose certain export restrictions. 10 As a participant in the collection
market, the municipality would retain the power either to deliver the
waste as it chooses or to contract with a private party to transport the
waste to a destination designated by the government. 171
A more problematic scenario involves a municipality acting as
a participant in the hauling market but not participating in the dis-
posal market. Such a municipality would not be able to impose im-
participant doctrine merely because strict government regulations make it difficult or
impossible for private competitors to enter a market").
168. This is consistent with the Pennsylvania district court's decision in Southcentral
Pennsylvania. See notes 80-87 and accompanying text. This proposition is also arguably consis-
tent with the ruling in Waste Recycling, although the Alabama district court did not even con-
sider the disposal facility to be owned by a municipality. Waste Recycling, 814 F. Supp. at 1573.
However, such a scheme clearly would violate South-Central Timber. See 467 U.S. at 95. See
also Petersen and Abramowitz, 22 Fordham Urban L. J. at 381-82 n.128 (cited in note 1)
(maintaining that the "attempt to restrict the flow of waste under the guise of the governments
ownership of the [disposal] facility is considered to be an impermissible downstream
restriction").
169. In this scenario, the city may collect the garbage itself or create a contractual or fran-
chise relationship with one or more private haulers.
170. SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 515; USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1288-89.
171. SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 515. However, it could not enact a flow control ordinance simi-
lar to the regulation struck down in Carbone.
Babylon's export restriction scheme in USA Recycling appears particularly strategic. The
town's arrangement with its hauler, BSSCI, did not even mandate that BSSCI transport the
waste to a designated facility. USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1279. Remember, however, that in
the parties' contract, Babylon reserved the right to designate a specific site. Id. See note 132.
Nevertheless, since Babylon owned the disposal facility that it sought to protect, it could provide
that BSSCI would not be charged a tipping fee. USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1279. Revenue lost
from the collection of a tipping fee would be regained by means of a "general" tax, a method
specifically advocated in Carbone. Id. at 1285. Therefore, Babylon was able to manipulate mar-
ket forces so that its disposal facility would be the most economically attractive destination for
BSSCI. Most courts would likely consider this type of "economic flow contror' to satisfy dormant
commerce clause scrutiny. See Peterson and Abramowitz, 22 Fordham Urban L. J. at 404-06
(cited in note 1) (claiming that such a strategy "should be very likely to withstand Commerce
Clause analysis"). See also USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1291; Richard J. Roddewig and Glenn C.
Sechen, Municipal Solid Waste: The Uncertain Future of Flow Control-A Municipal
Perspective, 26 Urban Law 801, 815 (1994) (claiming that Carbone "may have, and perhaps
should have, been decided differently if the transfer station were municipally owned").
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port restrictions on waste entering the jurisdiction. 172 Language in
SSC Corp. suggests that it would also be forbidden from imposing
export restrictions on waste generated within its borders. 173 The SSC
Corp. court's painstaking effort to distinguish White and South-
Central Timber based on Boston's participation in vertical markets
leads to the conclusion that it considers participation in both the dis-
posal market and the hauling market as a necessary prerequisite for
the ability to impose export restrictions. 74 Apparently, the court rea-
soned that if a municipality is not participating in the downstream
disposal market, then South-Central Timber will prevent export re-
strictions. 175
A. Reconciling South-Central Timber
The final scenario exposes the only flaw in the Second Circuit's
analysis: its attempt to reconcile its decision in SSC Corp. with both
White and South-Central Timber.
This is an impossible task because the two cannot be recon-
ciled. The Supreme Court's decision in South-Central Timber is a
vain attempt to justify an opposite conclusion from White in essen-
tially the same situation. Thus, any attempt to apply one of the cases
runs afoul of the other, creating a confusion of the issue. 76
Any distinction between the circumstances in White and the
scenario in South-Central Timber is simply illusory. Despite the
South-Central Timber plurality's attempt at differentiation, Boston's
meddling upstream in the labor market is clearly analogous to
Alaska's meddling downstream in the timber processing market.
During the initial determination of whether the market participant
exception should apply, courts should focus on the state's activity
rather than the effect of its participation.17 The opinion appears to be
172. Otherwise, it would contradict City of Philadelphia. Any argument that it is acting as
a participant because of its activity as a waste hauler clearly would be futile, since there is no
connection between its position as a hauler and the disposal of out-of-state waste at a private
facility.
173. 66 F.3d at 515.
174. Id. See also notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
175. SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 515.
176. It would also be plausible simply to confine South-Central Timber to its factual con-
text. But see Coenen, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 473 (cited in note 22) (stating that South-Central
Timber should prevail and that the permissible upstream effect present in White should be lim-
ited to the context of construction workers).
177. On a practical level it would be nonsensical to impose a formalistic constraint on the
ability to impact a vertical market. In reality, many businesses use economic forces to impact a
market in which they are not a participant. See Weyhrauch, 15 Envir. L. at 615 (cited in note
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"unduly formaistic"'178 in light of the fact that the state could have
achieved the same result by utilizing different avenues.17 9 Rebuking
South-Central Timber would create a clearer standard as opposed to
creating an arbitrary delineation of what constitutes unacceptable
downstream intrusion. 180
Lower courts should simply consider the South-Central Timber
decision as an anomaly and confine it to its facts. This would enable
the courts to apply the cohesive framework of the classic market
participant exception decisions: Alexandria Scrap, White, and Reeves.
Under this analysis, it should be inconsequential whether the
government participates in a vertical market. Inquiry would cease
after determining whether a government is acting as a regulator by
exercising regulatory power or as a participant by exercising economic
pressure. According to this logic, Smithtown could use its economic
power as a market participant as leverage to command its waste
haulers to dispose the garbage at any site designated by the town.
Likewise, Babylon could take advantage of its participation in both
26) (recognizing that "most markets extend far and wide and will exert economic forces on other
markets either under the auspices of regulation or the dynamics of market participation").
178. South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 103 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
179. The plurality even conceded, yet found it "unimportant," that Alaska could have
achieved its objective by "selling only to Alaska processors, by vertical integration, or by direct
subsidy." Id. at 99.
180. As an exasperated Justice Jackson once stated: "I give up. Now I realize fully what
Mark Twain meant when he said, 'The more you explain it, the more I don't understand it."'
Securities and Exch. Commn v. Chenery Co., 332 U.S. 194, 214 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Many commentators have expressed discontent with the analysis in South-Central Timber.
See, for example, Weyhrauch, 15 Envir. L. at 608, 615 (cited in note 26) (maintaining that the
decision "does more to obfuscate" the distinction between market participants and market
regulators); Seamon, 1985 Duke L. J. at 722 (cited in note 22) (contending that South-Central
Timber "complicates the present state of the dormant commerce clause analysis without improv-
ing it!'); Polelle, 15 Whittier L. Rev. at 676 (cited in note 51) (noting the "formalistic and prob-
lematic" nature of the decision). But see Coenen, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 353-54 (cited in note 22)
(mentioning the "heightened regard to formalism" and arguing that these concerns "counsel
against bright-line rules applied with an indifference to the form of state participation"). For a
theoretical analysis and critique of the market participant doctrine, see generally id. at 398
(proposing that the "Court's market-participant decisions reflect a sound, if complex, accommo-
dation of competing constitutional values"); Christine H. Kellett, The Market Participant
Doctrine: No Longer "Good Sense" or "Sound Law," 9 Temple Envir. L. & Tech. J. 169 (1990)
(advocating the abandonment of the doctrine); Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and
Interstate Equality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 487 (1981) (justifying the exception on the grounds that
state residents have a right to use their resources for their own self interest); Laurence Tribe,
Constitutional Choices 144-46 (Harvard U., 1985) (maintaining that states that create commerce
have a greater entitlement to the benefits of the exception); Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State
and the Market, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1097 (1988) (advocating the utilization of economic efficiency
theory to establish a framework of analysis for constructing the market participant exception);
Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1091 (1986) (defending the exemption on the premise that
state spending programs are inherently less discriminatory than taxes and regulations).
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markets to create economic incentives that would encourage BSSCI to
dispose of its waste at the municipal incinerator.
The Second Circuit cannot be faulted for attempting to recon-
cile White and South-Central Timber in SSC Corp. 181 The Supreme
Court has failed to articulate a coherent, consistent elucidation of the
market participant doctrine. Until the Court sufficiently clarifies the
doctrine, overrules South-Central Timber, overrules principles of the
three classic cases, or overrules the entire market participant excep-
tion, lower courts will continue to struggle with the reconciliation of
South-Central Timber with Alexandria Scrap, White, and Reeves.
Abandoning South-Central Timber would leave clearer guide-
lines for municipalities seeking to fulfill the task of solid waste man-
agement. Adopting the classical view would permit municipalities
that enter the waste hauling markets as participants to exert eco-
nomic pressure in the form of bargaining power that would essentially
result in export restrictions. As long as the municipality exercised
economic power and not regulatory power, the market participant ex-
ception would shield it from dormant commerce clause scrutiny.
Although it remains difficult to determine whether a governmental
181. The crux of the issue in SSC Corp. concerned whether Smithtown's hauling contract
"more closely resemble[d]" the scenario in White or the scenario in South-Central Timber, 66
F.3d at 514. The SSC Corp. court attempted to compare Smithtown's scheme to that of Boston
by claiming that Smithtown was "a 'major participant' in two 'discrete, identifiable class[es] of
economic activity."' Id. (quoting White, 460 U.S. at 211 n.7) (emphasis added). The problem
with this analogy lies in its manipulation of the quote in White and misinterpretation of its
reasoning. Arguably, the White court was attempting to claim that a separate upstream labor
market was not affected by Boston's activity since the workers were agents of the city in a
"substantial if informal sense." White, 460 U.S. at 211 n.7. The White majority thus only ac-
knowledged the existence of a single market instead of two entirely distinct markets. Therefore,
the Second Circuit's manipulation of the decision's language, by making it plural, distorts the
logic of the White court.
In reality, Smithtown's practice clearly impacted a downstream market. The spurious dis-
tinction between White and South-Central Timber cannot be reconciled in SSC Corp. Just as
Alaska attempted to enact mandates concerning where purchasers could process their timber,
Smithtown attempted to dictate where garbage collectors could haul the waste. Theoretically,
both of these impositions create an impact on a downstream market. Furthermore, both cases
resemble instances of economic pressure rather than regulatory pressure because the enact-
ments only apply to parties that choose to deal with the governments. The Second Circuit
should have acknowledged that Smithtown engaged in the same activity as Alaska and conceded
the inconsistency of SSC Corp. and South-Central Timber. The only plausible response that
could be asserted is that SSC Corp. is properly distinguishable from South-Central Timber since
Smithtown actually participated in the downstream market. SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 516
(implying that Alaska's practice would have been permissible had it been a participant in the
downstream timber processing market). Yet the essence of South-Central Timber entails a
prohibition on participatory activity that affects a separate market. 467 U.S. at 97 ("The State
may not impose conditions ... that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that particu-
lar marke'). It should not make a difference whether the state is participating in both mar-
kets.
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entity is acting as a participant or a regulator, 182 this approach would
avoid the additional dilemma encountered by observing downstream
markets.
B. Limiting Antitrust Immunity
The market participant exception rests on the notion that
when a government acts as a market participant, it should be able to
function in the same capacity as a private entity. 183 However, gov-
ernments may not be capable of acting on equal footing with private
businesses. In light of their inherent sovereign nature coupled with
their access to a wealth of resources, governments may actually gain
an advantage over private entities when shielded by the market par-
ticipant exception.5 4 A more prudent approach, therefore, may be to
182. It is often extremely difficult to delineate whether a government is acting as a proprie-
tor as opposed to a regulator. In fact, governments frequently act in a participatory and regula-
tory capacity simultaneously. See Pomper, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1322 (cited in note 51)
(maintaining that it is "notoriously difficult to draw" a line between a state acting as a market
participant and a market regulator); Kellett, 9 Temple Envir. L. & Tech. J. at 172 (cited in note
180) (stating that the classification is "subjective at best'); Karl Manheim, New-Age Federalism
and the Market Participant Doctrine, 22 Ariz. St. L. J. 559, 606-07 (1990) (asserting that the
distinction is an "illusion"). However, it has also been argued that the market participant ex-
ception demands more "flexibility" than the traditional/nontraditional standard of National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Kline, 96 Dickinson L. Rev. at 388-89 (cited in
note 50). Kline also proposes that the "market participant/regulator label, by contrast, hinges
not on whether a particular type of activity is involved, but on the form of governmental
involvement." Id. at 388. Thus, it had been argued that one relevant factor is whether the
government has expended financial resources. See id. at 390-91 (proposing a "test' of "whether
state sales, purchases, or subsidies are made available through a program of state spending or
otherwise involve property, goods, or services owned by the state in a nonfictional sense"). For
another framework, see Coenen, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 441 (cited in note 22) (establishing a multi-
factoral market participant analysis).
With respect to solid waste management, courts should weigh carefully numerous criteria in
order to determine whether a municipality is acting as a market regulator or market partici-
pant. As previously noted, a state often performs the two functions simultaneously. See Kline,
96 Dickinson L. Rev. at 400 (cited in note 50) (proposing that "[a]s a rule, substantial state po-
lice regulation of an industry (the waste disposal industry in particular) should not deprive the
state of the opportunity to participate in the regulated market'). But see Pomper, 137 U. Pa. L.
Rev. at 1322 (cited in note 51) (stating that "[t]he regulatory purpose of such acts should not
disqualify [municipalities] from application of the 'market participant exception"); Meyers, 79
Georgetown L. J. at 579-80 (cited in note 2) (contending that "[i]f jurisdictions are simultane-
ously regulating the landfill services market and participating in it, they should not be allowed
recourse to the market participant exception").
183. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438-39.
184. See Polelle, 15 Whittier L. Rev. at 665 (cited in note 51) (maintaining that
"[g]overnment will always have the potential for exercising greater economic power than most
businesses or individuals. Its virtually unlimited power to tax and borrow in order to provide
revenue for its government-run operations is a power denied to a private enterprise who is di-
rectly tied to the need to turn a profit for existence"); Kovacs and Anderson, 18 Envir. L. at 804
(cited in note 3) (arguing that currently the market participant exception "does not promote
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scrutinize the custom of the private industry and ensure that the
market participation exception does not provide the government with
an unfair advantage over that industry.185 Such scrutiny would en-
sure that a government enjoys protection under the market partici-
pant exception only when it truly acts in the same capacity as a pri-
vate entity.8 6
One major problem that arises with the reinvigoration of the
market participant exception is the potential for a municipality to
abuse the doctrine by using it as a sword instead of a shield.187 This
occurs when a municipality achieves a competitive advantage in one
market by virtue of its participation in a vertical market. In SSC
Corp. and USA Recycling, Smithtown and Babylon were attempting to
enhance their position in the disposal market by exercising economic
pressure in the upstream hauling market. Such activity operates to
the detriment of private disposal facilities attempting to compete with
the facilities favored by the municipality.
A possible solution to this problem is to withdraw antitrust
immunity when a state or local government acts as a market partici-
pant. This approach would serve as a check on governments that at-
tempt to utilize the market participant exception as a loophole to
avoid commerce clause scrutiny.
Generally, courts extend state antitrust immunity to local gov-
ernments that act pursuant to clearly enunciated state policy. 88 In
evenhandedness, but rather provides states an unfair advantage over private sector partici-
pants").
185. See Kline, 96 Dickinson L. Rev. at 416 (cited in note 50) (proposing that the "Swin
court should have focused less on the terms of the restraint and their propensity to restrain pri-
vate transactions and more on whether the resulting market influence comported with estab-
lished concepts of private trade in the waste disposal industry").
186. See Barton B. Clark, Comment, Give 'Em Enough Rope: States, Subdivisions and the
Market Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 615, 627(1993) (proposing that "'market participation' should be defined as those state actions which
could legally be undertaken by a private party acting in the market').
187. See James F. Ponsoldt, Balancing Federalism and Free Markets: Toward Renewed
Antitrust Policing, Privatization, or a "State Supervision" Screen for Municipal Market
Participant Conduct, 48 S.M.U. L. Rev. 1783, 1787 (1995) (discussing the attractiveness of a
municipality acting as a participant monopoly, since "monopoly profits frequently provide a po-
litically preferable alternative to taxes as a general revenue source"). Dicta by the Supreme
Court has, nevertheless, asserted that a municipality, unlike a private party, poses "little or no
danger that is involved in a private price-fixing arrangement." Town of Hallie v. Eau Claire,
471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985) (emphasis omitted). However, it has been aptly suggested that
"[m]unicipalities are just as capable as private actors of violating antitrust and free market pol-
icy." Ponsoldt, 48 S.M.U. L. Rev. at 1795 n.63.
188. The Court originally granted antitrust immunity to states in Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943). Parker, however, expressly avoided discussing the scenario of a state acting as
a proprietor. Id. at 351-52. The Court extended antitrust exemption to municipalities in City of
Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413, and Hallie, 471 U.S. at 42. See also SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 517
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Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Assn, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories,89
however, the Supreme Court first suggested in dicta that "there is no
[antitrust] exemption for state purchases to compete with private
enterprise." 190 Justice Rehnquist referred to this case in his dissent in
South-Central Timber, maintaining that "antitrust laws apply to a
State only when it is acting as a market participant."1
91
Limiting antitrust immunity for state and local governments
acting as market participants would certainly promote evenhanded-
ness.192 The original objective of the market participant doctrine was
(holding that Smithtown was acting pursuant to policy expounded by the New York state legis-
lature). For a more in-depth discussion of the application of antitrust immunity to municipali-
ties, see generally Ponsoldt, 48 S.M.U. L. Rev. 1783 (cited in note 187); Robert E. Bienstock,
Comment, Municipal Antitrust Liability: Beyond Immunity, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1829 (1985)
(formulating guidelines for antitrust liability of nonimmune municipal defendants).
189. 460 U.S. 150 (1983).
190. Id. at 156-57. The case involved a challenge to a governmental hospital that competed
with private pharmacies under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1994 ed.). Jefferson
County, 460 U.S. at 152.
191. South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 102 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist
made the statement while criticizing the plurality for relying on antitrust cases to "justify plac-
ing Alaska in the market-regulatory category." Id. at 103 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice
White's opinion had stated that "[i]t is no defense in an action charging vertical trade restraints
that the same end could be achieved through vertical integration." Id. at 98 (White. J.).
This principle was also enunciated in by the Court in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1991) (suggesting that antitrust immunity does not ap-
ply "where the State acts not in a regulatory capacity but as a participant in a given market").
See also id. at 379 ("Ve reiterate that, with the possible market participant exception, any
action that qualifies as state action is 'ipso facto ... exempt from operation of the antitrust
laws'" (quoting Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 580 (1984)). For further discussion of the
ramifications of Omni, see Einer Elhauge, Making Sense of Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80
Cal. L. Rev. 1177, 1189-91 (1992). See also Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 418-22 (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring) (arguing that Parker immunity was not intended to be extended to municipalities acting as
market participants); Genetech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 948 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(holding that in order for a state to enjoy antitrust immunity, its activity "must be taken in the
state's 'sovereign capacity,' and not as a market participant in competition with commercial
enterprise").
It could also be argued that the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-46
(1994 ed.), serves as a "plain statement' by Congress that it intended for municipalities to be
subject to antitrust laws when acting as market participants. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 467 (1991) (implementing the "plain statemene' rule to determine congressional intent).
The statute codifies antitrust immunity to be enjoyed by municipal governments when acting in
a regulatory capacity. 15 U.S.C. §§ 35-36. The argument follows that the statute's silence con-
cerning declaratory and injunctive relief (though it prohibits monetary damages) from municipal
defendants arguably expresses intent to restrict Parker immunity. However, this contention
appears to be flawed since courts have consistently segregated the statutory scope of damages
from the analysis of whether the law applies to a particular party or action.
192. See Ponsoldt, 48 S.M.U. L. Rev. at 1797, 1811 (cited in note 187) (proposing that anti-
trust immunity should only apply to market participants whose activity is both authorized by
the state and actively supported by the state); Clark, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 629 (cited in note 186)
(asserting that "if a state takes actions that would violate the antitrust laws if undertaken by a
private party, the state [should] be subject to dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny"); Kenneth J.
King, Note, The Preemption Alternative to Municipal Antitrust Liability, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
145, 166-69 (1982) (proposing that market participants should not be exempt from antitrust
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the notion of fairness: if the government enters a market it should be
able to receive the same benefits as a private actor. 193 However, a
governmental proprietor that is permitted to retain antitrust immu-
nity while bearing the cloak of a market participant receives an unfair
advantage over its private competitors. Limiting this immunity
would advance the original objective of maintaining evenhanded-
ness.
194
The Second Circuit encountered the issue of antitrust immu-
nity in SSC Corp., but did not adequately address it.195 Although a
few lower courts have faced the issue, no strong precedent exists with
respect to vertical integration involving municipal solid waste man-
agement. 96
Even if this methodology were applied in the context of SSC
Corp. and USA Recycling, it appears unlikely that the practices of
Smithtown or Babylon would violate antitrust law. First, courts have
consistently held that municipalities may monopolize the solid waste
hauling market.197 The more intriguing antitrust question presented
laws); Kline, 96 Dickinson L. Rev. at 380, 398-99 (cited in note 50) (same); Kovacs and
Anderson, 18 Envir. L. at 805-09 (cited in note 3) (arguing that antitrust exemption provides
market participants with an unfair advantage); Bienstock, 73 Cal. L. Rev. at 1869 (cited in note
188) (proposing that municipalities should be viewed as "private parties when they are chal-
lenged in a market participant capacity").
193. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 439 n.12.
194. The underlying principle is that "[i]f municipalities act and compete with private busi-
ness, they should be subject to the same laws." Ponsoldt, 48 S.M.U. L. Rev. at 1805 n.117 (cited
in note 187).
195. SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 517-18. Fault for this lies with the plaintiff, however, since it
raised the issue in a backhanded fashion. Instead of asserting that antitrust laws should apply
to Smithtown if it were indeed classified as a market participant, SSC argued that the town
should not be characterized as a market participant, because then it would be culpable for anti-
trust violations. Id. at 517. Therefore, the Court provided cursory attention to the issue and
basically dismissed the contention based on the axiom that statutes are interpreted in a manner
that is consistent with the Constitution. Id. at 518.
Apparently SSC attempted to utilize the analogy of antitrust in order to define Smithtown
as a market participant. Although it has also been suggested that antitrust concepts should
help define when a government is acting as a market regulator, this presents a circular trap.
The circularity occurs when market regulation is defined as that which would subject a
government to antitrust laws while at the same time antitrust laws are deemed only to apply to
governments acting as regulators. For a proposal of antitrust laws serving as a guideline, see
Kline, 96 Dickinson L. Rev. at 400 (cited in note 50) (maintaining that "[a]ntitrust principles of
'monopolization' and 'attempted monopolization' should help to discern state proprietary
conduct from indirect market regulation" (emphasis in original).
196. See Central Iowa Refuse Systems, Inc. v. Des Moines Metropolitan Solid Waste Agency,
715 F.2d 419, 427-28 (8th Cir. 1983) (upholding a municipal monopoly of solid waste collection
services); Hybud, 742 F.2d at 957-62 (same); Seay Bros., Inc. v. Albuquerque, 601 F. Supp. 1518,
1521-23 (D.N.M. 1985) (same); Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Management, Inc., 803 F. Supp.
451, 461-63 (D. Me. 1992) (upholding flow control ordinance); Savage v. Waste Management,
Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1505, 1508-10 (D.S.C. 1985) (upholding antitrust immunity to county that
created a franchise relationship with a waste collection service).
197. See notes 163-65.
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concerns whether a municipality could use its monopoly position in
the waste hauling market as leverage to benefit its market position in
the vertical disposal market. Competitors in the disposal market
would be the entities disadvantaged by arrangements that favor mu-
nicipal dump sites. Nevertheless, it appears that this practice would
not be an unfair trade practice. If a municipality can monopolize the
hauling market, it is free to transport the garbage to any site that it
chooses. 198 Therefore, creating a contractual or franchise relationship
with a private hauler should not impact the municipality's right to
designate a dumping site. 199
V. CONCLUSION
State and municipal leaders faced with the solid waste crisis
should be permitted to utilize creative approaches to resolve this envi-
ronmental dilemma. Absent congressional preemption,200 local gov-
ernments will always face dormant commerce clause challenges to
their strategies. In order to create a coherent framework on which
municipalities can rely, the Supreme Court should reexamine the
market participant doctrine and establish a clearer guideline. The
Second Circuit's decisions in SSC Corp. and USA Recycling help to
solidify the market participant exception as a viable protection for
municipalities seeking ways to address the dilemma of solid waste
management. Whereas the Third Circuit's decision in Swin legiti-
mized the exception with respect to import bans, SSC Corp. and USA
Recycling stand as prominent authority for the use of the exception
with regard to export restrictions. These cases help resolve any doubt
198. See Petersen and Abramowitz, 22 Fordham Urban L. J. at 396 (cited in note 1)
(asserting that if a municipality performs the task of collecting garbage, "it is indisputable that
the municipality can then control where that waste is disposed").
199. There are many economic reasons why a city would desire to delegate the task to a
private hauler as an agent of the city. As long as the agreement is voluntary, the analysis
should not be any different from that used when the city hauled the garbage itself. See id. at
397-404 (discussing the validity of contractual and franchise relationships). Also, a city could
create economic incentives to convince a private hauler to dump the garbage at a municipally
favored site, such as in USA Recycling. See 66 F.3d at 1291. See also Petersen and
Abramowitz, 22 Fordham Urban L. J. at 404-06 (cited in note 1) (discussing "economic flow con-
trot').
200. For a discussion of proposals of congressional preemption in the market of solid waste,
see Petersen and Abramowitz, 22 Fordham Urban L. J. at 407-15 (cited in note 1) (discussing
various potential congressional approaches); Weinberg, 25 Envir. L. at 64-72 (cited in note 2)
(same); Meyers, 79 Georgetown L. J. at 585-89 (cited in note 2) (same); Engel, 73 N.C. L. Rev. at
1546-60 (cited in note 3) (discussing alternatives and proposing that Congress should authorize
the formation of regional interstate arrangements).
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created by Carbone and provide a new level of predictability for mu-
nicipalities fearful of commerce clause challenges to their waste man-
agement strategies.
The confusion in SSC Corp. regarding South-Central Timber,
however, proves that until the Supreme Court clarifies its interpreta-
tion of the market participant doctrine, lower courts should adhere to
the principles of the classic cases of Alexandria Scrap, White, and
Reeves. These principles simply require asking whether the govern-
ment is acting in a participatory as opposed to a regulatory capacity.
Economic impacts in other markets should be ignored during this
phase of analysis.
In addition, once a state or locality is characterized as a mar-
ket participant, its enjoyment of antitrust immunity should be either
withdrawn or severely limited. This would further the goal of ensur-
ing that state actors and private actors compete on the same level.
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